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 The continued funding of America’s persistent trade and fiscal deficits has 
sparked debate among international economists. One controversial explanation argues 
that East Asia is pursuing “Bretton Woods II” and funding American deficits as part of a 
greater development policy. This paper examines the Chinese policy response to the 
global economic crisis and finds that China’s policy actions provide evidence for 
“Bretton Woods  II.” Furthermore, the Sino-American relationship is now characterized 









PRESENCE AND ENDURANCE OF AMERICAN DEFICITS 
 
 The large American current account and fiscal deficits are notable and puzzling 
traits of the international economic system. Indeed, during this decade the United States’ 
current account rose from $360 billion in 2000 to a peak of $712 billion in 2006 and still 
finished 2009 at $420 billion (U.S. BEA, U.S. International Transactions). The financial 
inflows necessary to close these deficits are large as well, reaching $843 b illion at their 
peak in 2007. Despite the difficult economic times that limit trade and financial flows the 
US still ran a $420 b illion current account deficit with $197 b illion in financial inflows 
(U.S. BEA, U.S. International Transactions). Researchers are currently divided in their 
explanations for the existence, durability and international willingne ss to finance these 
large deficits. It remains a puzzle, as large deficits should increase the risk of holding 
American debt and force American interest rates higher as investors require greater 
compensation for the greater risk. However, American deficits remain large and interest 
rates largely unimpacted. 1
 One explanation for the endurance of these high de ficits and low interest rates 
involves a new formation of the Bretton Woods system. The original Bretton Woods was 
characterized by a less economically developed periphery- Japan and Europe- that 
attempted to reach the level of development of a more advanced center- the United 
States-  through an economic development strategy that focused on expor ts to the center 
   
                                                 
 
 
1 Yield on the US 10-year bond is currently at 3.9%, down from the 6% it started the decade at.  
 2 
(Eichengreen, 2004). To encourage exports, countries on the periphery promoted high 
levels of manufacturing investment while maintaining exchange rates that were 
underva lued relative to the center’s currency. An undervalued exchange rate required 
other policy efforts including capital controls to prevent speculative inflows that could 
overwhelm the financial system. In addition, countering the forces that drove Japanese 
and European currency appreciation required their central banks to purchase American 
debt and accumulate a large amount of foreign exchange reserves.  
 In a controversial paper, Dooley et al. (2005) argue for what is now described as 
“Bretton Woods II” (BWII) because of its similarities with the previous system. In the 
newly constituted system, the United States remains at the center while East Asia 
replaces Japan and Europe on the periphery. Like Japan and Europe before them, East 
Asia’s deliberate economic development strategy involves exports to the center, an 
undervalued exchange rate, capital controls and foreign exchange reserve accumulation. 
Dooley et al. (2005) assert that the motivation behind the East Asian emphasis on exports 
as a source of economic growth is because it subjects Chinese manufactures to the 
discipline of competing on the global market. Exports allow leaders on the periphery to 
incorporate global prices into their economies in order to ensure the development of an 
efficient capital stock and avoid the problems with make-work that plague other 
development strategies.  
 The main causal mechanism driving the system is East Asia’s need to absorb 
underemployed labor (Dooley et al. 2007). To absorb this surplus, authorities set their 
national real wage rate below the global wage rate in order to attract investment. This 
attracts investment because it gives investors returns that are equal to the difference 
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between the two wage rates plus a normal return on capital. As investment grows, 
policymakers allow the real wage rate to increase as the underemployed labor stock is 
gradually incorporated into the global economy. As a result, the East Asian trade and 
capital flows that support the American deficits are driven by the absorption of the 
underemployed labor and can occur so long as the real wage adjustment stays on the 
same path.  
 Authorities can control the increase in the real wage rate through either do mestic 
inflation or the real exchange rate. They can either maintain an undervalued currency peg 
and allow wage inflation to be higher than in the center or, under a managed float, can set 
wages at or below the center while allowing the currency to appreciate. As a result, 
Dooley et al. (2007) argue that those calling for an appreciation in the exchange rate due 
to capital inflows will only lead to Asian authorities maintaining their path of wage 
revaluation by controlling inflation. Therefore, Dooley et al. (2007 ) argue that it is 
irrelevant if East Asian countries pursue a fixed peg or managed float because the real 
wage rate will remain the same. So long as policymakers can control the wage rate, they 
generate the same growth in reserves.   
  Dooley et al. (2005) posit that this explains many aspects of the current 
international economic system. At the end of the period o f adjustment East Asia will 
receive a fully employed labor stock that is internationally competitive. The potential 
losses on foreign exchange reserves that could occur when their currencies are revalued 
away from the United States Dollar (USD) fixed-exchange rate will be smaller than the 
gains they will receive from a more developed capital stock. This explains the East Asian 
accumulation of American foreign exchange, and why East Asian countries are willing to 
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absorb low-yielding American securities that could lose value if their currency 
appreciates relative to the USD. Currency and foreign exchange policy is subordinated to 
the overall developmental strategy. It also explains why the yield on American securities 
is not greater, despite large current account and fiscal deficits. Peripheral countries are 
financing these deficits to ensure their access to the American market. Lastly, because 
East Asia-particularly China-currently is attempting to absorb such a large supply of 
underemployed workers, the system is durable and will remain in existence until those 
workers are absorbed.   
 Critics of the new BWII system question its durability and ability to remain more 
than a temporary arrangement because of institutional weaknesses (Eichengreen 2004). 
To remain intact the system requires cooperation, as the first state to defect and sell its 
USD reserves reduces the value of the reserves of the other non-defecting countries. As a 
result, each country is incentivized to defect first and sell its reserves so as to not suffer 
large losses. Eichengreen (2004) notes that during the original Bretton Woods the 
Europeans had created the first collective transnational institutions that eventually 
became the European Union. This enabled the necessary cooperation that allowed the 
system to survive as long as it did. In contrast, Asia contains no collective transnational 
institutions with enforcement power.  
 In addition, at the time of the original Bretton Woods, the European countries 
were more homogenous in their economic progress, leading them to have similar 
economic interests that allowed them to act in unison (Eichengreen, 2004). Lardy (2004) 
echoes the concern that the differing levels of development will undermine the system by 
noting that China is the only East Asian state that completely fits under the Bretton 
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Woods II framework. For example, on many economic characteristics the developed and 
labor-short Japan is the opposite of developing and labor-abundant China. As a result, the 
two do not seem as if they should appear under the same theory. Similarly the economies 
of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Thailand contain differences that prevent 
their easy grouping and do not neatly fit into the Bretton Woods 2 framework.     
 The system is also fragile because the United States shows little desire to restrain 
its deficits. The United States policy of financing its deficits through low-yielding do llar 
debt will lead to the depreciation of the dollar and a subsequent decline in the value of 
dollar-denominated assets (Roubini and Setser, 2005). The longer an official central bank 
such as the PBoC continues to purchase American assets, the larger the losses will be 
when the Yuan appreciates. As deficits remain and the United States’ need for financing 
continues, it becomes more likely that creditors demand be tter terms for financing to 
compensate for the increased risk of capital loss (Obsfteld and Rogoff, 2007) 
(Eichengreen, 2004) ( Roubini  and Setser,2005).  
 There is also d isagreement over the effectiveness of capital controls and financial 
repression. Per Dooley (2007) capital controls and financial repression are necessary to 
keep East Asian wages from increasing too rapidly and pushing East Asia from their real 
wage rate adjustment path. However, Eichengreen (2004) argues that capital controls are 
no longer as effective, since capital can now move more freely than during the period of 
the original Bretton Woods. If capital controls are not maintained, China will be forced to 
revalue its currency, ending the Bretton Woods system. Roubini and Setser (2005) agree, 
and argue that the PBoC is having d ifficulty sterilizing capital inflows, leading to the risk 
of runaway inflation. In addition, the large capital inflows that China receives require 
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sterilization through the purchase of USD-denominated assets leaving the PBoC with 
greater downside in the event that the Yuan appreciates.   
 This paper examines the policy response of China to the globa l economic crisis in 
order to determine if its actions provide any evidence for the existence or durability of the 
Bretton Woods II system.2
 This paper contributes to the economic debate over the BWII system. The existing 
literature does not examine the BWII theory to see if it is consistent with the policies that 
China implements in response to the globa l economic crisis. As the crisis unfolded, 
policy with the goa l of restarting the Chinese economy can provide ins ight  into the 
validity of BWII by revealing what economic sectors are considered important and what 
China cons iders to be  its main sources of economic growth and development. By 
providing evidence for the BWII system, this work is relevant to international economists 
and a lso contributes to the deba te over the existence and endurance of de ficits and how 
 Because of the large governmental role directing a national 
development strategy outlined in BWII, it is important to examine government actions. 
This is especially important in response to important crisis and events in order to 
determine if prior arguments remain relevant as shifts in policy could occur due to the 
crisis. This paper argues that China’s policy response to the global economic crisis of 
2008, including maintaining an undervalued currency peg, supporting exports and 
increasing manufacturing investment, is consistent with the continued existence of the 
BWII system.  
                                                 
 
 
2 While BWII is a theory on East Asia, China’s large population, economy and high economic growth play 
such a crit ical role in the functioning of BWII that it is impossible to imagine BWII remain ing viable as a 
theory if it cannot exp lain China’s actions. 
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long it can take for them to adjust to equilibrium. This also provides evidence in the 
debate between the effectiveness of the standard inter-temporal consumption model of 
trade to predict economic outcomes.  
Lastly, by contributing to the theoretical understanding of the economic 
relationship between the United States and China this work can lead to practical insights 
that provide useful information for the construction of either American or Chinese po licy. 
Since it initiated economic reforms in 1978, China has experienced a high rate of 
economic growth and poverty reduction. Over this period of time, China’s GDP increased 
from $148 billion in 1978 to over $4.4 billion by 2008 (World Bank, World Development 
Indicators, 2008)  
This paper is organized as follows. Section two examines China’s recent trends of 
investment and export-promotion that characterize China’s economic development. 
Section three investigates China’s policy response to the global economic crisis, a policy 
response that is consistent with BWII. It also examines the American response to the 
global economic crisis and the influence on Sino-American trade pattern. Section four 
argues that the two countries are now codependent. It discusses the implications of that 
relationship and identifies potential sources of tension that might arise.  
to become one of the wealthiest states in the world. As it grew, China’s 
economic connections with the United States strengthened and in 2009 the two countries 
traded goods that totaled over $365 billion in value (United States International Trade 
Commission, Dataweb, 2009). Understanding the Sino-American economic relationship 
helps po licymakers understand the interests of each country in other areas such as North 
Korea’s nuclear program (Sanger, 2009, May 15) or the Copenhagen climate talks 
























CHINA’S EXPORT AND INVESTMENT LED GROWTH 
 
 China’s desire to be an important actor in the global economy was a direct result 
of the failure of past economic models to generate growth. Maoist isolation prevented the 
adoption of new technologies and stunted China’s technological development. The result 
was a poorly developed capital stock that was incapable of producing goods that were 
competitive on the international market. Shifting towards global integration allowed 
China to access and adopt new technologies to improve its capital stock as it moved away 
from isolation to become a global trading power. 
 The end result is an economic system that is institutionalized to encourage 
investment in manufacturing for export-led growth. China’s economy is marked by 
interconnected savings and investment policies that couple with currency policy to 
promote Chinese exports and investment. (Prasad and Rajan, 2008). This is analogous to 
the original Bretton Woods, as in both eras export and investment- led growth is a soc ial 
compact that invo lves worke rs agreeing to lower wage growth. In return, they receive 
higher living standards later as the result of higher rates of investment and export growth 
(Eichengren, 2004).  
 From the start of the reform process, and consistent with the BWII framework, 
China placed particular emphasis on exports. The intent was to copy the export- led 
growth of other East Asian countries, notably Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan (Naughton, 2007 ). The first major policy initiative with a large impact on 
Chinese exports occurred in 1985 with the creation of four “Special Economic Zones” 
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(SEZ) as part of the Coastal Development Strategy.  The SEZs were granted preferential 
tax treatment while relative freedom was granted to the foreign firms that set up business 
operations in the SEZs. In addition, foreign investors were allowed to bring in imports 
free of tariffs provided that they were destined to be further processed and exported 
(Chow, 2007). This provided the foundation for the creation of an Export Processing 
trading regime and the expansion of foreign investment enterprises (FIEs). As a result of 
these measures, Chinese trade increased from 1985 to 1995.   
 China next promoted and encouraged export development by joining the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Entry required China to further liberalize the trading 
sector of its economy by reducing tariffs as well as licensing and quota restrictions on 
both imports and exports (Lardy, 2002). China also loosened the restrictions on which 
companies are allowed to conduct trade and dropped the requirement that trading 
companies must partner with a state-owned enterprise (Lardy, 2002) These reforms 
allowed China to keep pace with how production and trade flows were changing as a 
result of the globalization of production. Because of the globalization of production, 
tradable goods were no longer wholly manufactured in one country. Instead, the 
individual components that constituted the final product were manufactured in different 
countries based on where it was most advantageous to produce that component. 
Enterprises then brought the different components together where they were assembled 
into the final product. China’s pre-WTO trade restrictions didn’t provide the necessary 




Figure 1: Chinese Growth 




 Over the past decade China’s investment and export- led growth model became 
more apparent.  While government consumption remained largely flat, Figure 1 shows 
the increased importance of investment and a positive trade balance to the Chinese 
economy. This is particularly true since 2004, as investment rose to approximately 40% 
of GDP. China’s trade balance increased as well, revealing the greater amount of 
resources that were channeled through investment into a positive trade balance. This is 
consistent with the BWII framework, as the high growth in expor ts ensures that new 
investment is globally competitive.   
 For China to pursue an investment and expo rt- led growth model a high 
accumulation of capital is required. Capital is needed to provide funding for investment 
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identity, a trade surplus is an excess of savings over investment (Razmi, 2008).   
Therefore, a positive trade balance requires China to export its excess capital. Given 
China’s high level of investment, it is remarkable that its savings rate is sufficient to fund 
both new investment as well as the savings necessary to finance a trade surplus. 
 One of the two main sources of this capital is FDI. China is one of the largest 
global recipients of FDI as 2008 inflows measured $108 billion (UNCTAD, World 
Investment Report, 2009). In addition to funding, FDI provides positive externalities and 
allows China access to improved technology and managerial knowledge which are 
crucial to its development (Yao, 2006). Because of these externalities, the FDI 
contribution to China’s economic growth is large and exerts a disproportionate influence 
on Chinese growth when compared to the size of the capital flows relative to GDP 




   
Figure 2: Chinese Savings 
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  The other dominant source of capital for the Chinese economy is domestic savings, 
particularly the savings of enterprises (Kuijs, 2005). First, enterprises are very profitable 
in China. This is due to the high rate of growth in output per worker (Bosworth and 
Collins 2008). In addition, Chinese firms are now more actively involved in the 
production of more sophisticated products which provide greater profit margins (Kuijs, 
2005). Second, state owned enterprises (SOE) receive subsidies that allow them to export 
cheaper goods and reduce their costs. These subsidies can include utility discounts, free 
office space and favorable bank loans, among others (Eckhaus, 2005). In addition, 
reforms that passed in the mid-1990s restructured the SOEs and made them more 
profitable by removing many of the previous social obligations SOEs provided to 
workers including education and pensions (Chow, 2007). These developments lead to 
greater profitability, giving enterprises a greater capacity to save because they are 
drawing on a larger pool of profit. Third, China’s inefficient financial sector is not 
developed enough to allow for enterprises to borrow at reasonable terms in the event that 
they are in need of financing. As a result, enterprises must aggressively save in order to 
be prepared for incidents that might require additional capital (Gao, Jin, Riedel, 2007). 
Finally, many Chinese firms do not issue dividends. This allows them to accumulate 
savings which are then funneled into more investment (Aziz, Cui 2007).  
 The Chinese economic system also increases enterprise savings and investment 
through the restraint of household income. Household income results from a number of 
sources, and in China each is institutionalized in a way that reduces household income 
and reduces domestic demand and consumption (Prime and Qi, 2009). First, economic 
growth and productivity increases are greater than household income from wages and 
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employment (Aziz and Cui, 2007). This results in Chinese workers facing a decline in the 
labor share of national income as more national income goes to enterprises (Aziz and 
Cui, 2007). Second, household income from investments and savings is low due to capital 
controls and financial repression. Capital controls limit the investment options for 
households to banks where the interest rate is controlled by the central government. 
These rates are set at a level that produces a negative real return (Lardy, 2008). Third, as 
mentioned above, despite their profitability enterprise saving is not distributed back to the 
government where it can be spent on social programs and income transfers. For example, 
in 2005 these transfers reached only half a percent of GDP (Aziz and Cui, 2007). 
 The large accumulation of savings retained by enterprises and the high amount of 
banking deposits are the two primary sources of capital for Chinese investment (Kuijs, 
2005). A majority of this investment is done by enterprises, with fixed asset investment in 
manufacturing the dominant destination of investment (Barnett and Brooks, 2006). By 
allowing enterprises to retain their earnings and receive favorable conditions when 
borrowing from the financial sector, they shift resources and production towards 
tradables and exportable goods. This increase in China’s manufacturing capability 
enables it to produce a higher amount of exportable goods. As a result of these efforts in 
2008 China produced over nine percent of world goods exports, a marked increase from 
the three and a half percent it constituted in 1999 (Gaulier, LEmoine and Unal-Kesenci, 
2007). 
 In order to further promote exports, China utilizes capital controls and financial 
repression that enable it to counteract the effects of an undervalued exchange rate. By 
acting to prevent the app reciation of the Yuan on international fina ncial markets China 
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makes Chinese-produced goods cheaper and more attractive to consumers. However, 
China must purchase securities in the international financial market in order to counteract 
appreciative forces and maintain an undervalued currency. This step also increases the 
Chinese domestic money supply and necessitates monetary sterilization and financial 
repression in order to prevent inflation.  In turn, capital controls are needed to prevent 
capital outflows attempting to find higher interest rates (Gao, Jin and Riedel, 2004). 
Financial repression includes a negative real rate of return on deposits in the Chinese 
banking system (Lardy, 2008). The buildup in reserves allow the banks to fund the high 
level of investment as well as purchase the government bonds issued to absorb liquidity 
from the economy and sterilize the inflationary pressures that could arise from an 
undervalued exchange rate.  
 As a result of these successful reforms China is one of the leading global trading 
countries. In addition, trade now constitutes thirty pe rcent of the Chinese economy’s 
yearly growth; up from a fifteen percent share during the 1990s  (Guo and N’Diaye, 
2009). Figure 4 illustrates the high amount of the Chinese economy that is involved in 
trade. In addition, China began to run significant current account balances that reached 
ten percent of GDP. While Figure 4 also shows the decline in trade that is the result of the 
global economic crisis, Chinese trade flows are rebounding with the monthly totals from 







Figure 3: Chinese Trade and Trade Balance 




 The purchaser of a large portion of China’s increased trade was the United States. 
As the United States emerged from recession in 2001 and China entered the WTO, 
demand for Chinese products accelerated rapidly.  Figure 4 reveals the large increase in 
American imports of Chinese products.  After remaining sluggish in 2001, American 
imports expanded over 20% annually from 2001 to 2005.  Even after slowing from this 
pace imports still increased 18% in 2006 and 12% in 2007 before slowing to 4.5% annual 
growth in 2008.  Overall, by 2008 Chinese exports to the United States had increased 
238% from their 2000 levels. Figure 4 also shows the decline that occurred in response to 
the global economic crisis. However, the decline was shallow and Chinese exports to the 
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Figure 4: America’s Chinese Impo rts 








































POLICY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN 
 
 The decline in output and shrinkage of trade initiated by the globa l economic 
crisis prompted Chinese leaders to craft a policy response in order to restart economic 
growth. To do so, Chinese authorities responded to the crisis with a policy of cutting 
interest rates and encouraging investment in manufacturing thereby supporting exports 
and investment. It is notable in this regard that Chinese policy remained consistent with 
its previous efforts to channel resources into exports and investment and that the 
economic crisis only worked to solidify this approach to economic growth in the Chinese 
economy.  
 After spending 2007 increasing interest rates in order to prevent overheating and 
slow the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, the Central Committee responded to the 
slowdown in external demand by instituting a loose monetary policy (Peoples Bank of 
China, 2009). This was achieved through a series of interest rate and demand deposit 
cuts. Interest rates are the only price mechanisms in the Chinese economy that are still 
centrally controlled (Gao, Jin and Riedel, 2004) and because of the immature 
development of China’s capital markets, Chinese policymakers’ efforts control the larger 
economy through loan growth are very effective (Dickinson, Ford and Sun, 2010). By 
lowering the interest rate, Chinese policymakers expand the pool of enterprises that can 
afford loans on those terms. This increases loan demand and loan volume while 
stimulating economic activity. Table 1 reveals that after raising rates six times in 2007, 
Chinese leaders cut rates five times in 2008. These cuts occurred in response to the 
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rapidly deteriorating economic climate. They show how quickly Chinese leaders 
switched to a loose monetary policy, even cutting rates twice in the month of October. 
Table 1 also shows that Chinese leaders reduced the rate of return on demand deposits. 
This was to maintain a sufficient spread between deposits and loans and allowed Chinese 
commercial banks to remain profitable. However, as mentioned earlier this financial 
repression has a negative impact on the incomes of savers and households and acts to 




































07 0.72 2.61 3.06 4.95 5.85 6.57 6.93 7.20 
Jul-07 0.81 2.88 3.96 5.22 6.03 6.84 7.20 7.38 
Aug-
07 0.81 3.15 4.23 5.49 6.21 7.02 7.20 7.56 
Sep-
07 0.81 3.42 4.50 5.76 6.48 7.29 7.47 7.83 
Dec-
07 0.72 3.78 4.68 5.85 6.57 7.47 7.74 7.83 
Sep-
08 0.72 3.15 4.41 5.58 6.21 7.20 7.56 7.74 
Oct-
08 0.72 3.15 4.41 5.58 6.12 6.93 7.29 7.47 
Oct-
08 0.72 3.24 4.14 5.13 6.03 6.75 7.02 7.20 
Nov-
08 0.36 2.24 3.06 3.87 5.04 5.58 5.94 6.12 
Dec-
08 0.36 1.98 2.79 3.60 4.86 5.31 5.40 5.94 
Table 1: Chinese Interest Rates and Demand Deposits 


















2009 annualized 202,360 37% 62,666 31% 
2009 through 
october  168,634 
 
52,222 31% 
2008 148,167 26% 46,345 31% 
2007 117,414 26% 35,497 30% 
2006 93,472 24% 26,399 28% 
2005 75,096 7% 20,319 27% 
2004 70,073 26% 14,644 21% 
2003 55,566 28% 
 
  
2002 43,499 17% 
 
  
2001 37,213      
Table 2: Chinese Fixed Asset Investment 




 China’s policy to increase loan growth was successful. New RMB-denominated 
loans grew by 9.59 trillion. This was up 4.69 trillion, ninety-five percent annually, after 
growing by 4.9 trillion in 2008 (Peoples Bank of China, 2009). By September of 2009 the 
outstanding balance of loans in China reached 41.4 trillion after starting 2009 at 32.1 
trillion (Peoples Bank of China, 2009a). These loans encouraged investment in fixed 
assets, particularly manufacturing.  This rapid increase in loan growth also increased 
loans that financed fixed asset investment. Table 2 shows the growth in fixed asset 
investment. Even more important, Table 2 reveals that much of this investment growth 
was channeled into the trade-sensitive manufacturing sector. 
 Despite this growth in loans and speculative financial capital inflows-“hot 
money”- totaling $73 billion in 2009, consumer inflation remains low and was even 
negative during 2009 (WB, CQU). The absence of significant inflation further bolsters 
the BWII case. If China’s policy of increasing loan growth led to uncontrolled inflation 
and the rise of the wage rate this would prevent the gradual absorption of underemployed 
labor that is the basis for BWII. However, the proper functioning of capital controls and 
financial repression that prevent inflation and a re needed for the survival of the BWII 
system remain intact and effective (Ma and McCauley, 2008). They allow China to 
maintain a currency peg in addition to an independent monetary policy.  
 Coupled with policies that funded a large increase in investment, Chinese leaders 
also adjusted their currency policy in response to the slowing global economy. After 
China allowed the Yuan to appreciate beginning in July of 2005, the Yuan left its peg of 
8.3 Yuan to the US Dollar and reached a value of 6.8 Yuan/USD by June of 2008. It is 
this value that the Yuan is now re-pegged at, as the Yuan has not appreciated past 6.8 
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(Peoples Bank of China, Exchange Rate, 2010). As the economic crisis deepened, China 
resumed the Yuan to USD peg in order to continue to boost exports by delivering an 
undervalued currency. Maintaining the currency peg required the PBoC to raise its 
foreign exchange reserves by $453 billion to $2.4 trillion.  Despite originating in the 
United States, the Chinese policy response to the global economic crisis further solidifies 
and supports the BWII thesis. Driven by an increase in manufacturing investment and the 
need for an export market, China will continue to act in the manner described by BWII 
and support American deficits to ensure access to the American market. Indeed, despite 
the difficulties in the American economy, the Sino-American trade balance still remains 
at over $220 billion. This is greater than the levels of only a few years ago, as the trade 
deficit of 2005 totaled $202 b illion (United States International Trade Commission, 
Dataweb, 2009). Financially the United States’ position as the dominant center country in 
the international economy remains strong, with US assets emerging as the safe haven 
during the crisis. In the case of China, it halted purchase of corporate bonds and equities 
and channeled its entire surplus of US Dollars into US Treasuries (Pandey and Setser, 
2009). 
 In addition, further support for the large current account deficits between the 
United States and China is provided by the continuing efforts of American policymakers 
to stimulate American consumption. The overarching goal is to increase disposable 
income through a combination of transfer payments or tax relief to compensate for the 
declining private demand that result from job losses or a decline in income. In an open 
economy the inevitable side-effect is an increase in the consumption of Chinese products. 
The first attempt was the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008.  The Act sent rebate checks to 
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American taxpayers in the hope that the increased income would arrest the decline in 
consumption and encourage economic growth. Individuals received $600 dollars while 
married couples received $1200 (H.R. 5140, 2008).  There were payments to veterans 
and senior citizens as well as tax breaks for companies that purchased new business 
equipment. In total, the Economic Stimulus Act cost $150 billion (H.R. 5140, 2008).  
 Following the Economic Stimulus Act, in 2009 American leaders enacted the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). ARRA provided a tax credits in an 
attempt to reduce the tax load and provide a higher amount of disposable income. 
Retirees receiving Social Security benefits and individuals on disability payments also 
received additional reimbursements. ARRA temporarily prevented the expansion of the 
alternative minimum tax (AMT) (H.R.1, 2009). Lastly, in response to rising 
unemployment numbers ARRA extended unemployment benefits (H.R. 1, 2009).  
 In addition to fiscal efforts to stimulate consumption, the Federal Reserve took 
steps to promote consumption by loosening the flow of credit to households. As credit 
markets froze, the Federal Reserve became an increasingly large financial intermediary. 
This occurred to facilitate the provision of credit including consumer credit from credit 
cards. Many credit card loans are bundled into asset-backed securities (ABS) and sold to 
investors through the process of securitization.  The capital received from investors for 
purchasing these ABSs allows credit card lenders to continue providing new loans.  
However, with the disruption in the credit markets securitization had slowed.  As a result, 
the flow of credit was halted, reducing many consumers’ access to credit.  In response, 
the Federal Reserve has instituted the Term Asset-Backed Stability Loan Facility (TALF) 
with the goal of aiding the securitization markets.  By lending money to investors to 
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purchase ABSs, the Federal Reserve can free up consumer credit and encourage 


























 This paper argues that based on the policy response of China, the current 
economic crisis makes a stronger case for the existence of BWII to illustrate the patterns 
of trade and capital imbalances that are observed in the international economy. In 
addition, China’s economic development model remains focused on exports and 
investment. At the same time the United States is still running large deficits and pursuing 
policies that require large capital inflows.3
  This leads to several policy predictions. First, this dependency reduces the ability 
of each side to pursue a policy of coercion. For example, the Chinese cannot attempt to 
gain leverage on the United States by threatening to halt Chinas purchase of American 
 China requires the United States to be the final 
destination for its products and savings while the United States benefits from the low 
interest rates that China’s capital inflows provide. This capital flow from the periphery to 
the center allows the United States to finance fiscal and current account deficits at lower 
interest rates while also receiving a premium on its assets relative to its liabilities 
(Gourinchas and Rey, 2005). As a result, the two sides are now in a state of 
codependency, where the costs of defecting from the existing relationship will cause 
economic disruption that is greater than the costs of maintaining the current state of the 
relationship. As a result, bo th countries will not take steps to end this relationship.  
                                                 
 
 
3 The Congressional Budgetary Office estimates the American fiscal deficit  for fiscal year 2010 to be $1.3 
trillion, 9.9% of GDP. The total predicted deficit for fiscal years 2011 to 2015 is $3.12 trillion. (CBO,  
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debt. There are a number of reasons for this. Pursuing an exports and investment- led 
growth model requires China to continue to purchase American debt. It is in China’s 
interest to purchase these securities in order to prevent a rise in American interest rates. A 
rise in interest rates would reduce American economic growth and thereby lower 
consumption of Chinese products. At a time when Chinese domestic consumption 
remains subdued because of financial repression and the European economy is struggling 
(Donadio, 2010, February 9) China doesn’t have alternative locations to sell its products 
and needs the United States market. A dispute that provokes American tariffs and 
restrictions on Chinese goods would severely impair exports at a time when China is 
especially economically vulnerable. As a result, China’s leverage is limited because it 
would expose itself to economic damage and is vulnerable to retaliation. Second, the 
United States is not solely dependent on China for its deficit financing. The United States 
is the largest economy in the globa l economic system with a highly liberalized financial 
system that provides it access to alternative sources of funding (Drezner, 2009). The 
United States would have the ability to tap many different sources of credit if the need 
arose. Third, China lacks the skills and ability to diversify its large foreign exchange 
reserve holdings (Hanenman and Rosen, 2009). 
 Furthermore, it is likely that the United States would emerge the less impacted of 
the two countries if an economic dispute were to erupt. The Chinese economy is more 
sensitive and exposed to trade. The aggregate trade value in 2009 between the United 
States and China was $360 b illion (United States International Trade Commission, 
Dataweb, 2009). With an economy valued at approximately $14 trillion for the United 
States versus $4.4 trillion for China (World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2008), 
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the percentage of the United States economy involved Sino-American trade is 
significantly smaller than that of China. Hence, a trade disruption is likely to have a more 
significant impact on the Chinese economy than on the American one especially after 
considering that as the wealthier state, the United States would have a greater amount of 
resources with which to endure an economic disruption.     
  Even though the United States and China will remain economically dependent, it 
doesn’t follow that the two nations will not experience economic tension. C hina’s 
expansionary monetary policy that increases investment will also generate extra capacity 
for production that translates into greater exports (Dickinson, Ford and Sun 2010). At a 
time of economic hardship in the United States this is likely to provoke a protectionist 
political response (Buckley, 2010, February 10). In addition, President Obama has 
recently remarked that a goal of his administration is to increase American exports 
(Cooper, 2010, January 28). This could create additional friction on trade levels and 
China’s undervalued Yuan policy if the United States pushes to weaken the USD in order 
to encourage exports. There is a potential risk that China and the United States 
accidentally fall into a disastrous economic dispute. It could be driven by difficult 
economic times that generate political pressure on Chinese and American leaders to slow 
the flow of trade and capital between the two countries.    
 Lastly, China will continue to be hesitant in moving away from an undervalued 
currency peg in order to ensure that its goods remain attractive on the international level. 
In addition, if China does allow the Yuan to appreciate, it will be slow and measured, 
similar to the appreciation that occurred between 2005 and 2008. With the United States 
and Europe, the two largest markets for Chinese goods, continuing to have economic 
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difficulties Chinese leaders will be hesitant to allow the Yuan to appreciate too soon and 
too quickly because of the negative price impact on exports. Furthermore, per the BWII 
framework China can allow the Yuan to gradually appreciate yet remain on its optimized 
wage growth pa th through the control of wages and inflation. As a result, the same net 
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